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Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of economic growth? This paper pro-
vides a systematic evaluation of the eect of corruption on growth, using meta-
analysis techniques for 460 estimates from 41 studies. We nd that publication
bias, albeit acute, does not dissipate the genuine and negative eect of corruption
on growth. Among the main factors explaining the variation in the estimated ef-
fects, we nd that taking account of (a) trade openness and institutions and (b)
authors with academic aliations (as opposed to think tanks and international or-
ganizations) seems to help generate less negative eects of corruption on growth.
(JEL: O1, P3)
1 Introduction
Although corruption is much more common in poor than in rich countries, it is also clear
that it is not restricted to specic regions or levels of economic development (Abed and
Gupta (eds.), 2002). The most pressing research questions are how severe it actually is
as a constraint on economic activity and what are the mechanisms used by corruption
to exert these eects (Basu, 2006; Pande, 2008).
One of the dening debates in the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of
corruption has been whether it greases or sands the wheels of economic growth and devel-
opment. Those in favor of the greasing hypothesis argue that corruption facilitates trade
that would not have happened otherwise and promotes eciency by allowing private-
sector agents to circumvent cumbersome regulations (Le, 1964; Huntington, 1968).
Numerous examples support this view, showing that in highly restrictive regulatory en-
vironments, corruption can enhance economic growth by stimulating entrepreneurship
and eciency (De Soto, 1990; Egger and Winner, 2005; Levy, 2007).
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2Opponents of this view have constructed a solid rebuttal by arguing that the greasing
eect of corruption is only possible as a second-best option in a malfunctioning institu-
tional setting. Thus, in order to properly evaluate the eects of corruption one has to
recognize its endogeneity with respect to institutions (Aidt, 2009). Theoretical analyses
supporting this view abound suggests that corruption sands the wheels of growth. Rock
and Bonnett (2004) argue that corruption reduces investment in most developing coun-
tries and particularly in small open economies. Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005) nd
that it has detrimental eects on human-capital accumulation. Concerning its magni-
tude, Fisman and Svensson (2007) estimate that a 1-percent increase in corruption leads
to a 3-percent reduction in rm growth. This body of evidence informs the position of
key international policy actors and the ever increasing number of anticorruption agencies
and campaigns at both national and international fora (Meon and Weill, 2010).
Yet the body of empirical evidence on the economic consequences of corruption is not
conclusive (Svensson, 2005; Aidt, 2009). For example, the literature provides support to
phenomena such as the so-called Asian paradox (a positive correlation between corrup-
tion and growth in a number of fairly successful Asian economies, including China) even
after allowing for the eect of institutions, which shape the more recent versions of the
greasing-the-wheels hypothesis (Wedeman, 2002; Rock and Bonnett, 2004; Li and Wu,
2007; Vial and Hanoteau, 2010). This is a very interesting result in view of the recent
literature on technological traps, which highlights corruption as one of the primary con-
straints on emerging economic giants like China and India in their aspirations toward
reaching the world technological frontier (Nunn, 2007; Nunn and Treer, 2010). More
recently, Swaleheen argues that \In our detailed review of the current literature, we nd
that the conclusions on the eect of corruption on the rate of growth of an economy are
hesitant and qualied at best" (Swaleheen, 2011, p. 23).
The inconclusiveness of the evidence on the relationship between corruption and
growth can be explained by several factors. Econometrically, regressions that attempt
to infer a causal relationship between corruption and growth are often fraught with
reverse-causality and omitted-variable problems, which have so far not found a satis-
factory resolution (Aidt, 2009). In addition, the most popular measures of corruption
in the empirical literature are based on expert opinions, which are often loaded with
ideological bias and generate a corruption ranking of countries heavily biased towards
general perceptions of current or past politicoeconomic performance (Razandrakoto and
Roubaud, 2010). The inconclusiveness can also be driven by publication bias: although
it is understandable that not all econometric results are reported, their very selection
for reporting purposes may be aected by either the preferences of journal editors or
the agendas of the various international development institutions (interestingly, we nd
in this paper that such biases are signicantly smaller in peer-reviewed publications).
Finally, as is well known, for instance, from the empirical literature on inequality and
growth, cross-country correlations in the growth-related literature are generally clouded
in data-quality and other problems that tend to hide the welfare implications of any
economic phenomena or policy (Ravallion, 2001).
3The objective of this paper is to provide a rigorous and systematic survey of the
empirical literature on the eects of corruption on economic growth.1 Here we try to
(1) uncover whether there is a genuine relationship between corruption and growth, (2)
evaluate the direction of this relationship, and (3) identify the main factors or deter-
minants that may help explain the variation in the estimated eects of corruption on
growth. For these purposes, we put together a unique data set comprising a total of 460
empirical estimates of the eect of corruption on growth from 41 dierent studies (listed
in appendix section A.1).
Figure 1 contains the histogram of the t-values of all coecients of corruption on eco-
nomic growth that we collected. The mean t-value for the corruption eect on economic
growth is  1:32, with a standard deviation 2.59, indicating that on average the eect
of corruption on growth is negative and (marginally) signicant. However, a closer look
at the distribution shows that about 32 percent of these estimates support not only a
negative, but also a signicant, eect of corruption on growth, and 62 percent suggest
a statistically insignicant relationship, while only approximately 6 percent support a
positive and signicant relation. On this account alone, although one may be tempted
to argue that the support for the sanding hypothesis is greater than that for the greasing
hypothesis, the vast majority of the results support the view that the evidence is not
conclusive. Why is that so? This paper uses meta-analysis and meta-regression tech-
niques to establish the depth and extent of this inconclusiveness and try to identify the
main reasons for it.
Figure 1
Histogram of the t-Values of the Coecients of Corruption on Growth (n = 465)
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1 There are various excellent surveys of the literature on the causes and eects of corrup-
tion, for example Bardhan (1997), Svensson (2005), Lambsdor (2006), Pande (2008), Aidt
(2003, 2009), and Treisman (2007). However, ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst
quantitative survey of the econometric evidence on the corruption{growth nexus.
4What are the main factors that help to explain the variation we observe in Figure 1?
We nd that these are authors' aliation (academics systematically report smaller and
less negative eects), the use of xed eects (which tends to increase the negative eect of
corruption on growth, possibly on account of the fact that xed eects \purge" the vast
cross-country heterogeneity in the data), the type of corruption measure, the presence
of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in the sample (which also tends
to increase the overall negative eect), and the inclusion in the model of trade and
institutions, which both tend to deate the negative eect of corruption on economic
growth. We also nd that although publication bias seems to be severe in this literature,
there is plenty of evidence supporting a genuine (on average negative) eect of corruption
on growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we examine whether
there is evidence for a genuine relation between corruption and growth, as well as for
the existence and severity of reporting bias. In section 3 we present the data set we
constructed, covering a large number of factors that can potentially explain the variation
in these existing results. In section 4, we use meta-regression analysis techniques to
investigate the main determinants of the variation in the corruption{growth eects.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Is there a Genuine Relationship between Corruption and Growth?
For this paper, we put together a hand-collected data set comprising 460 estimated
eects (that is, coecients) of corruption on economic growth from 41 dierent empirical
studies (the studies are listed in appendix section A.1). The selection criteria we used
are as follows. In order to be included, a paper has to investigate econometrically the
relationship between corruption and economic growth across countries, and it has to
report regression coecients and their t-values or standard errors. In addition, it has
to report the number of observations and/or degrees of freedom and to report sucient
information to allow us to create the explanatory variables we require (listed in appendix
section A.2, Table A1). We also include in the data set all reported regression results
from each study, as opposed to selecting one set of results as representative or preferred.
This is because very few authors single out a set of preferred results. Notice that among
the excluded studies are those that deal with only one country (\case studies") and
those focusing on the eect of corruption on various macroeconomic variables other
than economic growth (such as FDI, investment, ination, government expenditures,
aid, and income inequality).
One explanation for the existence of bias in the literature is the alleged tendency
for the evidence in academic papers to lean towards statistically signicant results. The
simplest and most often used method to detect such bias is the informal examination
of a funnel graph. This is a scatterplot of the size of the treatment eect (e.g., the
coecient in a regression analysis) against a measure of its precision (Stanley, 2005;
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008). Since, in the absence of publication selection,
estimates will vary randomly (or symmetrically) around the \true" eect, the funnel
5Figure 2
Funnel Plot: Estimated Eect of Corruption on Economic Growth (n = 460)
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plot's asymmetry is the key for identifying publication bias.2 Figure 2 shows the funnel
plot for our data, which is clearly asymmetric, and thus pointing to the existence of
bias. Given that visual inspections are subjective and potentially misleading, we next
use meta-regression analysis to answer whether there is a genuine association between
corruption and growth in a more rigorous fashion.
Stanley (2001, 2005) argues that if there is a genuine association between two vari-
ables, there should be a positive relationship between the natural logarithm of the ab-
solute value of the t-statistic and the natural logarithm of the number of degrees of
freedom (df) in the regression. This is known as a meta-signicance test (MST). The
idea behind this is simple and based on the well-known property of statistical power.
The magnitude of the standardized test will vary positively with df only if there is an
overall genuine empirical eect. Card and Krueger (1995) impose a specic functional
form of the relationship as follows:
(1) lnjtij = 0 + 1 ln dfi + "i;
where ti and dfi denote the t-statistics and number of degrees of freedom in study i,
respectively. Stanley (2001, 2005) also develops a MST and shows that the value of the
slope coecient in equation (1) contains information on the extent of a publication bias
and on the existence of a genuine eect. If the slope coecient is less than zero, it is
concluded that the evidence is contaminated by publication bias and there is no genuine
association between the two variables. If the slope is larger than zero, there is a genuine
association between the variables. If the slope belongs to the interval 0 < 1 < 0:5,
2 The intuition is that studies with a smaller sample size should have larger sampling error,
while studies with a larger sample size should have lower sampling errors.
6there is a genuine association between the two variables, despite the existence of a bias
(Stanley, 2005, p. 329; Doucouliagos, 2005).
Given that random, large-sample misspecication biases may cause the MST to iden-
tify a genuine eect too frequently, Stanley (2008) recommends complementing the MST
with a FAT (funnel asymmetry test) and a PET (precision eect test). This amounts
to regressing the t-statistics of the estimated eects on the reciprocals of their standard
errors (Egger et al., 1997):
(2) ti = 0 + 1
1
Sei
+ ui;
where Sei denotes the standard error of the estimated coecients and ti denotes the t-
statistics. Testing for the statistical signicance of the intercept coecient represents a
test of publication bias. This is a direct and more rigorous test of funnel-plot asymmetry.
Moreover, Egger et al. (1997) argue that the sign of the intercept also indicates the
direction of the bias. A signicant slope coecient, on the other hand, points to the
existence of a genuine eect, irrespective of the possible publication bias (Stanley, 2008).
Table 1 shows the results from the FAT{PET and MST (equations (1) and (2),
respectively).3 The coecient of the degrees-of-freedom variable in the MST regression
is statistically signicant, with a value lying between zero and 0.5, indicating that despite
the presence of a publication bias, there is evidence for a genuine relationship between
corruption and growth. The intercept coecient in the FAT{PET regression is also
statistically signicant, thus conrming the presence of a publication bias. Moreover,
the negative sign of this coecient suggests that the bias is negative, indicating that
the \true" corruption{growth relationship is less negative than that commonly reported
in the literature. However, we observe a nonsignicant slope coecient in the FAT{
PET regression (Table 1, columns [3] and [4]) which casts doubt on the strength of a
genuine eect in the corruption{growth literature. In order to explore this relationship
further, we separate our sample into published and unpublished research and reestimate
the FAT{PET equation. Notice that out of the 41 studies in our data set, 20 are
published in peer-reviewed academic journals, while 21 are working or policy papers,
or reports. These results, reported in Table 2, indicate that the slope coecient is
statistically insignicant only in the unpublished research sample, while it is signicant
at the 1% level in the published research sample. This suggests a genuine relationship
between corruption and growth in published research, as well as the absence of such a
relationship in unpublished studies. This is a very important result, because it raises
the possibility that unpublished studies (which may be more policy-oriented) tend to
tolerate, substantially more than published studies, a bias towards a more negative and
signicant link between corruption and growth. Putting it dierently, the data shows
that peer-reviewed papers are systematically more likely to report a genuine eect of
corruption on growth than that of the literature as a whole. In what follows, we further
3 These results also obtain in a (much less standard) multivariate regression analysis (adding
further study characteristics to the specication). Details are available from the authors upon
request.
7investigate this issue, but rst we present the full database we put together to try to
understand the variation we nd in these corruption{growth eects.
Table 1
Tests for Genuine Eect and Reporting Bias (MST and FAT{PET tests)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln jtj ln jtj^ t t^
Log d.f. 0.144 0.144
(2.54) (2.68)
1=Se 0.0000463 0.0000463
(1.41) (0.11)
Constant  0.042  0.042  1.403  1.403
( 1.17) ( 0.18) ( 11.63) ( 7.70)
Observations 460 460 460 460
R2 0.01 0.0145 0.21 0.1912
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  Signicant at 5%,  sig-
nicant at 1%; ^bootstrap to derive robust standard errors with 1000 replications.
Table 2
Tests for Genuine Eect and Reporting Bias in Published and Unpublished Papers
(MST and FAT{PET tests)
Published Published, Unpublished Unpublished,
bootstrap bootstrap
[1] [2] [3] [4]
t t^ t t^
1=Se 0.000794 0.000720 0.0000172 0.0000219
(4.39) (4.48) (0.57) (0.73)
Constant  1.720  1.448  1.339  1.523
( 8.99) ( 8.04) ( 8.82) ( 9.47)
Observations 228 203 232 207
R2 0.078 0.091 0.001 0.003
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.  Signicant at 5%,  signif-
icant at 1%; ^bootstrap to derive robust standard errors with 1000 replications.
3 What does the \Average" Corruption{Growth Study Look Like?
The preceding analysis suggests that the body of evidence exploring the relationship
between corruption and economic growth may be biased and that this bias may be neg-
ative. Existing studies are systematically more likely to report negative and statistically
signicant estimates. We do nd evidence that despite the bias, the message that the
broad literature on corruption and growth conveys is genuine. If anything, there seems to
8be greater bias among unpublished papers and reports in favor of (on average) reporting
negative results than among published peer-reviewed academic manuscripts.
While our results are fairly instructive, a more rigorous view of the quality of the
message conveyed by the existing literature on corruption and growth is needed. In
keeping with the MRA literature, we attribute potential dierences in these results to
either dierences in the research process (e.g., dierences in specication, measurement,
and methodology) or dierences in real-world factors (e.g., regional and time dierences)
(Babecky and Campos, 2011). The variables we construct to capture these dierences
are described in appendix section A.2, Table A1; their basic statistics are reported in
Table A2.
In order to describe the dierences in econometric methodology, we construct dummy
variables, taking the value of 1 if the coecients originate from a cross-sectional model
(0 if from panel), if xed eects are used (0 otherwise), if there is an attempt to correct
for endogeneity (0 otherwise), if the focus of the paper is exclusively on one region (0
otherwise), and if the paper has been published in an academic journal (0 otherwise).4
Given that the approach and potential ideological bias may dier across researchers
belonging to academic and nonacademic environments, we also include a dummy variable
that takes the value zero if there is at least one author whose aliation is not in academia.
We nd that academic authors wrote 25 of the papers in our sample, providing
378 estimates, thus representing 82% of the total. The regressions for only one region
represent just 36 observations and 7.74% of the total. Slightly more than half of the
estimates in our data set were obtained using cross-sectional data (54%), while the
remaining ones use panel data. In 151 regressions, accounting for 32.47% of the total,
there is an explicit attempt to correct for endogeneity through the use of IV, 2SLS,
3SLS, or GMM techniques. Moreover, xed eects were used in 160 regressions, that is,
in 34.41% of the total. About half of the estimates are reported in journal articles, and
the other half in working papers, 43% of these latter being working papers of policy-
oriented institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.
Measurement is an important issue, especially in light of the growing literature that
questions the validity of global corruption indicators based on the perceptions of so-called
experts (Razandrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). In order to assess whether results on the
eect of corruption on growth are signicantly driven by the choice among measures
of corruption, we construct dummy variables that take into account the dierences in
corruption indexes used in each study or model. The most widely used measure is
from Transparency International (the Corruption Perception Index, CPI),5 which has
been used in about 36 percent of the cases (for 165 estimates). The index has been
4 One of the problems encountered in the MRA literature is that many of the observations
used in a regression analysis are not statistically independent. In meta-analysis, empirical
estimates are considered statistically independent if they are reported by dierent authors, or
if the same author reporting them uses dierent samples. Doucouliagos (2005) recommends
the use of the bootstrap to address the statistical dependence problem (reported below).
5 One diculty is that the Transparency International index has been improved over time.
In other words, there have been various changes in the underlying methodology, and although
these changes are vastly and carefully documented, they do generate diculties in comparing
9available since 1995 and covers approximately 150 countries. The CPI score is an expert-
perception measure, reecting the degree of corruption perceived by businesspersons
and country analysts. It ranges from 10 (\highly clean") to 0 (\highly corrupt"). The
second most popular measure of corruption is from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) of the Political Risk Group, which is used in about 28% of the regressions in our
sample (130 cases). This index gives lower values for higher levels of corruption. It has
monthly frequency and has been available since 1984. The CTC (Control for Corruption)
index of the World Bank is used in 43 cases (9.68% of the total) and ranges from  2:5
(high corruption) to 2:5 (low corruption) (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006).
The COMB variable captures the use of a mixture of dierent measures constructed
by dierent organizations (WB, ICRG, and TI).6 It was used in 16 cases, representing
3.44% of the total. The CPC variable captures whether or not corruption is measured
by a composite indicator, constructed by principal-component analysis. The remaining
measurement variable, OTHER, proxies measures not covered by the above categories.
It was used in 94 cases, accounting for 20% of our sample.7
In so far as econometric specication issues are concerned, our choice is driven by the
importance of controlling for a robust set of growth determinants so that the corruption
eects are not unduly aected by omitted-variable problems. This also allows us to
investigate the relative importance of various potential channels. To this end, dummy
variables were constructed taking the value 1 if trade or trade openness is present in the
model (0 otherwise), if institutional variables are included in the model (0 otherwise),
and similarly for human capital, investment, political institutions (or democracy), and
government expenditures or consumption. Trade or openness variables are included
in 32 percent of the cases (i.e., in 149 regressions), and various institutional quality
variables are used in 43 estimations accounting for only 9.25% of the total. Human-
capital or population variables are used in 337 estimations of the corruption eect,
which represent 72.63% of our sample. Investment is included in 155 estimations (33.3%).
Political institutions (or democracy) are included 84 times, that is, in 18% of our sample.
Government spending or consumption is included 185 times (40% of our sample). Finally,
we also create a dummy variable for whether initial conditions are included in the model
specication and nd that they are in 361 regressions representing 77.63% of the sample.
In order to capture the geographical focus of these corruption eects on growth,
a series of dummy variables are constructed that take the value 1 if the coecient
comes from a regression that contains transition countries (0 otherwise), and similarly
for Latin America (LAC), Middle East (MENA), Asia (ASIA) and Sub-Saharan Africa
(AFR). Note that these variables are meant to capture sample composition, and not
whether a study is based on a single region. Transition countries were included in 401
studies that use dierent \vintages" or \cohorts" of the CPI. We have explored this matter
through interactions with a time trend, and it does not qualitatively aect our main results.
For more details see http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveys indices/cpi.
6 This measure is used, for instance, by Rock and Bonnett (2004).
7 For example, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Mauro (1995) use measures from Business
International (BI), now incorporated into The Economist Intelligence Unit.
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regressions accounting for 86% of the total. Latin American countries were included 430
times, representing 92.5% of the total. Middle East and North African countries were
included in 401 regressions representing 86% of the total. Asian countries were included
431 times (92.7%), and African countries were included in 424 estimations (91% of the
total). The variable OTHERS is used for estimations containing other country groupings
(or dierent ways of splitting samples), such as OECD countries; it is used 403 times,
that is, in 86.7% of the cases. Finally, the midpoint of the time period covered by each
study is calculated to try to capture time eects.8
We observe that the simple pairwise correlation between corruption and growth,
reported in the literature, is negative both in itself and across dierent types of method-
ologies, specications, measurement choices, regions, and time periods included in the
underlying econometric studies. There is also a positive correlation between the length
of the time window of the study and the growth{corruption relationship.
What would a typical piece of empirical research on the eect of corruption on
economic growth look like using our data set? Firstly, the typical study is likely to be
written by authors in academia. The time window it covers is somewhat short, with an
average of nine and a half years. The typical paper does not control for endogeneity,
nor include country dummy variables or xed eects. There is an almost equal chance
to use panel or cross-sectional data. Yet the typical paper would favor Transparency
International as its main corruption measure. It is also likely to use a large multiregion
sample and have human capital among its explanatory variables. Variables controlling
for institutional quality are among those least likely to be found in a typical study, which
is a serious omission in light of the attention this factor receives in attempts to assess
the grease-versus-sand debate in the corruption-and-growth literature (Meon and Weill,
2010).
4 What Explains the Variation in the Estimated Eect of Corruption on Growth?
Many believe that the empirical literature on the eects of corruption on growth is incon-
clusive. Indeed, Figure 1 seems to support such views: there is an awful lot of variation
within the set of empirical estimates the literature has made available, and there are a
large number of insignicant results. Yet standard meta-analysis tests discussed above
show that although the underlying relationship seems to be genuine, the available empir-
ical evidence seems biased towards (on average) reporting negative eects of corruption
on growth. This makes it even more pressing to try to pinpoint the factors that are
most important in explaining the variation in the underlying corruption{growth eects.
8 We have also tried to deal with the dicult issue of paper quality. We collected data on
the number of Google Scholar citations (excluding self-citations). It ranges from zero to 3816
(for Mauro, 1995). We used it in our empirical analysis below as the yearly average number of
citations and did not nd it to be a robust factor (that is, it seems that the rest of our set of
explanatory variables does a good job of capturing the key elements of paper quality). These
results are available upon request.
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In order to do so, we estimate the following baseline equation:
(3) Yi = 0 + 1Xi + "i;
where Yi is the partial correlation between corruption and economic growth and Xi is a
vector of explanatory variables, which were described in section 3 above.9
In keeping with the MRA literature, we estimate both a xed-eects and a random-
eects version of equation (3). The xed-eects model assumes that the heterogeneity
in results is due to systematic dierences across studies and to sampling error, while the
random-eects model assumes, in addition, that there are unobserved factors that cannot
be captured by the set of explanatory variables.10 We also estimate a weighted least-
squares (WLS) model, attaching greater weights to observations with higher precision
(see Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2005). Finally, as indicated earlier, we use standard-
error bootstrapping to take account of the interdependence between observations in each
study (Doucouliagos, 2005). The main results from our empirical analysis are reported
in Table 3 (and Table 4 provides further conrmation of these main results). Column
(1) shows the xed-eects estimates, column (2) has the OLS Bootstrap estimates, the
WLS estimates are reported in column (3), and the random-eects (RE) estimates are in
column (4). Results using the general-to-specic method on the WLS and RE estimators
are reported in columns (5) and (6).
Table 3 identies that the main factors that help explain the observable variation in
the corruption{growth eects are the following (in parentheses are the respective coef-
cients taken from Table 3, column 6): the aliation of the authors (0.14), control for
endogeneity (0.07), the use of xed eects ( 0:21), the source or type of the corrup-
tion measure, the presence of MENA countries in the sample ( 0:25), the inclusion of
trade variables in the model (0.16), and controlling for institutions in the econometric
specication (0.23). Let us now interpret these ndings.
The positive and signicant coecient of the authors' aliation variable across the
dierent specications indicates that nonacademic authors tend to nd the eect of cor-
ruption on growth to be more harmful than do academic authors, all else the same.
This is an important result and is consistent with our nding that unpublished papers,
about half of which are policy papers, tend to be more averse to reporting nonnegative
corruption{growth estimates. Also notice that the coecient on publication type car-
ries the expected sign (the reported eects of corruption on growth are systematically
smaller, or more negative, than those reported in peer-reviewed publications), but, in
contrast with the coecient on authors' aliation, this conclusion is not robust across
the dierent estimators.
We also nd that econometric models that try to control for the endogeneity of
corruption with respect to economic growth tend to report more positive results than
9 For the advantages of using partial correlation as dependent variable in meta-regression
analysis, see Rosenthal (1991) and Meyer and Sinani (2009).
10 The tests developed in Higgins and Thompson (2002) point to the appropriateness of the
random- over the xed-eects model in this case. For sensitivity purposes, we report both
models.
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Table 3
Meta-Regression Analysis of the Eect of Corruption on Economic Growth
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Bootstrap WLS MR-RE WLS MR-RE
SEs GSpecic GSpecic
pubtype 0.0229 0.0229  0.0845  0.0215  0.0797
(0.0511) (0.0509) (0.0429) (0.0404) (0.0411)
Authors 0.133 0.133 0.161 0.134 0.160 0.145
(0.0593) (0.0405) (0.0466) (0.0453) (0.0462) (0.0390)
Countryregion  0.104  0.104  0.0820  0.0118
(0.156) (0.137) (0.1000) (0.126)
Panel  0.0513  0.0513  0.0369  0.0468  0.0353  0.0355
(0.0477) (0.0364) (0.0341) (0.0364) (0.0342) (0.0298)
endo 0.0612 0.0612 0.0708 0.0685 0.0732 0.0703
(0.0419) (0.0305) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0308) (0.0290)
xed  0.101  0.101  0.308  0.205  0.309  0.210
(0.0491) (0.0720) (0.0464) (0.0423) (0.0461) (0.0346)
mid  0.00247  0.00247 0.00545 0.00274 0.00571 0.00274
(0.00305) (0.00352) (0.00268) (0.00251) (0.00269) (0.00244)
wb  0.0674  0.0674  0.0514  0.0456
(0.253) (0.195) (0.189) (0.196)
icrg  0.229  0.229  0.242  0.250  0.202  0.106
(0.242) (0.184) (0.171) (0.188) (0.0857) (0.0356)
ticpi  0.292  0.292  0.283  0.266  0.236  0.124
(0.242) (0.189) (0.173) (0.188) (0.0872) (0.0348)
comb  0.333  0.333  0.290  0.327  0.253  0.198
(0.257) (0.188) (0.175) (0.200) (0.110) (0.0838)
other  0.172  0.172  0.236  0.158  0.197
(0.242) (0.186) (0.174) (0.188) (0.0967)
ctc  0.0178  0.0178  0.132  0.134  0.158
(0.282) (0.230) (0.195) (0.222) (0.105)
cpc  0.184  0.184  0.219  0.195  0.209  0.206
(0.123) (0.114) (0.132) (0.0935) (0.124) (0.0855)
initcond  0.0443  0.0443  0.138  0.0926  0.137  0.0869
(0.0650) (0.0589) (0.0501) (0.0504) (0.0492) (0.0454)
transit 0.0542 0.0542  0.102  0.00532  0.113
(0.0814) (0.0746) (0.0653) (0.0627) (0.0626)
lac 0.175 0.175 0.111 0.0668
(0.370) (0.224) (0.198) (0.330)
mena  0.285  0.285  0.341  0.273  0.342  0.254
(0.131) (0.163) (0.161) (0.103) (0.157) (0.0997)
asia 0.286 0.286 0.391 0.328 0.498 0.363
(0.353) (0.124) (0.129) (0.315) (0.170) (0.103)
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Table 3
(continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Bootstrap WLS MR-RE WLS MR-RE
SEs GSpecic GSpecic
afr 0.0840 0.0840 0.232 0.172 0.229 0.164
(0.120) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0939) (0.104) (0.0879)
others  0.168  0.168  0.181  0.157  0.181  0.153
(0.0694) (0.103) (0.100) (0.0605) (0.0945) (0.0578)
trade 0.129 0.129 0.198 0.158 0.198 0.161
(0.0526) (0.0434) (0.0353) (0.0398) (0.0349) (0.0371)
instit 0.219 0.219 0.223 0.220 0.237 0.235
(0.0816) (0.0563) (0.0538) (0.0620) (0.0497) (0.0550)
human  0.0475  0.0475  0.0546  0.0496  0.0482  0.0521
(0.0529) (0.0334) (0.0346) (0.0407) (0.0333) (0.0392)
invest 0.0326 0.0326 0.0238 0.00530 0.00424
(0.0454) (0.0537) (0.0430) (0.0363) (0.0331)
political  0.0855  0.0855  0.0983  0.0742  0.0907  0.0905
(0.0594) (0.0662) (0.0581) (0.0462) (0.0572) (0.0416)
gov  0.0706  0.0706  0.0361  0.0412  0.0399  0.0406
(0.0493) (0.0549) (0.0431) (0.0387) (0.0405) (0.0363)
Constant  0.0837  0.0837  0.0236  0.0696  0.0545  0.226
(0.271) (0.207) (0.207) (0.210) (0.142) (0.0839)
Observations 460 460 438 460 438 460
R2 0.185 0.185 0.448 0.447
Notes: Dependent variable is partial correlation coecient between corruption and
growth. The bootstrap is to derive robust standard errors, with 1000 replications. WLS
is weighted least squares with weights given by the reciprocal of the standard error.
MR-RE is for random eects. Gspecic refers to results obtained using the general-
to-specic method. Standard errors in parentheses with  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:1. All estimations carried out through the metareg routine in STATA.
studies that do not take endogeneity into account. This suggests that the negative bias in
this literature may be indeed driven by confusing correlation and causality. By contrast,
studies that control for unobserved heterogeneity with the use of xed eects tend to
report more negative eects than studies that do not. Wherever signicant, the signs
of the measures of corruption variables are negative, which may be explained by expert
perceptions being unduly driven by ideological biases (Razandrakoto and Roubaud,
2010), translating into a larger negative reported correlation between corruption and
growth.
Possibly one of the most interesting eects meta-analysis allows one to explore is
that of the channel variables, in this case trade or trade openness, institutional quality,
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human capital, investment, political/democracy eects and government consumption.
The inclusion of these variables produces coecients of corruption that measure its
direct eect on growth. On the other hand, the exclusion of these variables results in the
corruption variable measuring its total eect on growth. In other words, if the channel
variable has a negative (positive) sign, the direct eect of corruption on growth would be
smaller (larger) than the total eect (Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2006; Doucouliagos and
Ulubasoglu, 2008). The coecients of the trade openness and institutions variables are
consistently positive and signicant. For the direct eect of these variables on growth to
be larger than the total, we would need the indirect eect between corruption and these
two variables to be negative. In other words, if trade openness and institutions have
a positive eect on growth, corruption undermines this positive eect.11 This evidence
is especially interesting in light of innovations in the literature on technological traps
and barriers that corruption poses to emerging markets that attempt to use trade and
foreign direct investments eectively to reach the world technological frontier (Nunn and
Treer, 2010; Nunn, 2007).
Finally, we examine the eect of the regional variables in our MRA analysis of the
eects of corruption on growth eects. The most consistent result across specications is
that of a negative and signicant eect of the MENA region on the relationship between
corruption and growth and, to a somewhat lesser extent, that of a positive and signicant
eect of the ASIA region. This implies that corruption has a more negative eect on
growth in MENA and a more positive eect on growth in ASIA. The latter result is
consistent with the Asia paradox in the corruption{growth literature.
For sensitivity purposes, we reestimate all four MRA models for each group of vari-
ables separately (Table 4). The results are mostly consistent with those in Table 3,
except that the presence of a government expenditures variable is now signicant and
that the coecients on controlling for endogeneity and the Asian variable are no longer
signicant.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has tried to provide a rigorous assessment of the relationship between cor-
ruption and economic growth, using a data set comprising 460 estimates of this eect
from 41 dierent econometric studies. We use this unique data set to carry out an econo-
metric survey and try to throw light on the role of dierences in estimation methods,
econometric specication, measurement issues, and factors like regional focus and time
periods, in determining the distribution of the overall eect of corruption on economic
growth.
Maybe unsurprisingly to some, we detect a bias in the literature towards reporting
(on average) negative eects of corruption on growth. However, we also nd evidence
of a genuine eect of corruption on growth, which seems to be stronger in academic
11 Note that the opposite is true for the democracy variable. However, this variable is
negative and signicant in only two specications. Our results for all other channels are even
less conclusive.
17
than in nonacademic studies. Further, the large degree of heterogeneity in the available
corruption{growth results seems to be driven by whether the authors are aliated with
academic institutions and whether the underlying econometric model controls for po-
tential endogeneity and uses xed eects. The \sanding the wheels of growth" view of
corruption is supported by the evidence that corruption undermines the positive eect
of institutions and trade openness on growth. This gives support to the view that the
technological threat of emerging giants like China and India in the world economy may
be undermined by corruption and other institutional failures. Indeed, while we do nd
some evidence in favor of the Asian paradox, it does not survive further sensitivity tests.
At the same time, countries in the Middle East and North Africa region are likely to
experience more negative eect of corruption on growth than countries elsewhere.
Our results have important implications for future research. Firstly, we cannot nd
enough convincing evidence supporting the view that corruption, on its own, is capable
of greasing the wheels of economic growth and development. While the true relation-
ship between corruption and growth may be less negative than that prevailing in the
literature, nonacademic authors seem systematically more likely to report a negative
eect than academic authors. This eect seems to go beyond whether or not the study
is published in a peer-reviewed journal and, unfortunately, generates a powerful bias in
this body of empirical evidence. We also conclude that the application of more rigor-
ous econometric methodologies may be needed to sort out the debate in this literature.
In particular, we would greatly welcome studies that combine controls for endogeneity
and xed eects with specications encompassing various institutional and structural
reforms dimensions. If these become the norm in the future, we think that this will
contribute substantially to the improvement our understanding of the broad economic
implications of corruption.
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Table A1
Denitions of Variables
Variable
name
Denition
authors Dummy, =1 if all authors are from academia
panel Dummy, =1 if model uses cross-sectional data
endo Dummy, =1 if model controls for endogeneity
xed Dummy, =1 if model accounts for xed eects or country dummy
pubtype Dummy, =1 if study is published in a refereed journal
wb Dummy, =1 if model uses World Bank corruption measure
icrg Dummy, =1 if model uses International Country Risk Guide measure of
corruption
ticpi Dummy, =1 if model uses Transparency International measure
comb Dummy, =1 if model uses combined corruption measure (WB, ICRG, TI)
other Dummy, =1 if model uses other corruption measures
ctc. Dummy, =1 if model uses control-to-corruption measure
cpc Dummy, =1 if model uses corruption measure constructed by principal
components
trade Dummy, =1 if model contains trade or openness variable
instit Dummy, =1 if model contains institutional variable
human Dummy, =1 if model contains human-capital or population variable
invest Dummy, =1 if model contains investment variable
political Dummy, =1 if model contains political or democracy variable
gov Dummy, =1 if model contains government expenditures variable
transit Dummy, =1 if study contains transition countries
lac Dummy, =1 if study contains Latin American countries
mena Dummy, =1 if study contains Middle East and North African countries
asia Dummy, =1 if study contains Asian countries
afr Dummy, =1 if study contains African countries
others Dummy, =1 if study contains other countries not specied above
initcond Dummy, =1 if initial conditions are included in the regression
21
Table A2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable name Denition
Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. Freq. Percent
df 460 101.37 173.06 0 1498    
authors 460 0.82 0.38 0 1 378 82.00
countryregion 460 0.07 0.26 0 1 36 7.74
panel 460 0.53 0.50 0 1 249 53.55
endo 460 0.33 0.47 0 1 151 32.47
xed 460 0.35 0.48 0 1 160 34.41
mid 460 9.54 6.21 0 20    
pubtype 460 0.50 0.50 0 1 228 49.03
wb 460 0.03 0.17 0 1 13 2.8
icrg 460 0.28 0.45 0 1 130 27.96
ticpi 460 0.36 0.48 0 1 165 35.48
comb 460 0.03 0.18 0 1 16 3.44
other 460 0.20 0.40 0 1 94 20.22
ctc. 460 0.09 0.29 0 1 45 9.68
cpc 460 0.03 0.17 0 1 14 3.01
trade 460 0.32 0.47 0 1 149 32.04
instit 460 0.09 0.29 0 1 43 9.25
human 460 0.73 0.45 0 1 337 72.63
invest 460 0.33 0.47 0 1 155 33.33
political 460 0.18 0.39 0 1 84 18.06
gov 460 0.40 0.49 0 1 185 39.78
transit 460 0.86 0.34 0 1 401 86.24
lac 460 0.93 0.26 0 1 430 92.47
mena 460 0.86 0.34 0 1 401 86.24
asia 460 0.93 0.26 0 1 431 92.69
afr 460 0.91 0.28 0 1 424 91.18
others 460 0.87 0.34 0 1 403 86.67
initcond 460 0.78 0.41 0 1 361 77.63
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